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Mutually Quadratically Invariant Information Structures in
Two-Team Stochastic Dynamic Games
Marcello Colombino†, Roy S. Smith†, and Tyler H. Summers‡
Abstract— We formulate a two-team linear quadratic stochas-
tic dynamic game featuring two opposing teams each with
decentralized information structures. We introduce the concept
of mutual quadratic invariance (MQI), which, analogously to
quadratic invariance in (single team) decentralized control,
defines a class of interacting information structures for the
two teams under which optimal linear feedback control strate-
gies are easy to compute. We show that, for zero-sum two-
team dynamic games, structured state feedback Nash (saddle-
point) equilibrium strategies can be computed from equivalent
structured disturbance feedforward saddle point equilibrium
strategies. However, for nonzero-sum games we show via a
counterexample that a similar equivalence fails to hold. The
results are illustrated with a simple yet rich numerical example
that illustrates the importance of the information structure for
dynamic games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Future cyber-physical systems (CPS) will feature coop-
erative networks of autonomous decision making agents
equipped with embedded sensing, computation, communica-
tion, and actuation capabilities. These capabilities promise
to significantly enhance performance, but also render the
network vulnerable by increasing the number of access and
influence points available to attackers. “Red team-blue team”
scenarios, in which a defending team seeks to operate the
network efficiently and securely while the attacking team
seeks to disrupt network operation, have been used to qualita-
tively assess and improve security in military and intelligence
organizations, but have not received formal mathematical
analysis in a CPS context. Here we will study some fun-
damental properties in two-team stochastic dynamic games
in cyber-physical networks, with a focus on interactions of
the information structures of each team.
Dynamic game theory [1] offers a general framework for
the study of optimal decision making in stochastic and non-
cooperative environments. The theory can be viewed as a
marriage of game theory [2], with a focus on interactions of
multiple decision making agents, and optimal control theory
[3], [4], with a focus on dynamics and feedback. The main
elements of dynamic game theory are (1) a dynamical system
along with a set of agents whose actions influence the state
evolution of the system, (2) an objective function to be
†M. Colombino and R. Smith are with the Automatic Control Lab-
oratory, ETH Zurich, Switzerland. ‡T. Summers is with the Depart-
ment of Mechanical Engineering, University of Texas at Dallas, USA.
E-mail addresses: {mcolombi, rsmith}@control.ee.ethz.ch,
tyler.summers@utdallas.edu. This research is supported by the
National Science Foundation under grant CNS-1566127 and partially sup-
ported by the Swiss National Science Foundation grant 2–773337–12.
optimized associated with each agent, and (3) an information
structure that specifies information sets for each agent, i.e.,
who knows what and when.
Several special classes of dynamic games have been exten-
sively studied. In team decision theory all agents cooperate
to optimize the same objective function. Static team theory
traces back to the seminal work of Marschak and Radner [5]–
[7]. Decentralized control theory has developed from team
decision theory and control theory and introduces dynamics.
The presence of dynamics makes available information de-
pend on the actions of agents and significantly complicates
the problem. Dynamic aspects were studied in important
early work by Witsenhausen [8]–[10] and Ho [11], [12].
Witsenhausen’s famous counterexample [8] vividly demon-
strated the computational difficulties associated with team
decision making in dynamic and stochastic environments.
This still-unsolved counterexample described a simple team
decision problem in which a nonlinear strategy strictly out-
performs the optimal linear strategy and established deep
connections between control, communication, and informa-
tion theory. Research on decentralized and distributed control
theory has continued, and there has been a recent resurgence
of interest driven by the advent of large-scale cyber-physical
networks. Recent work has elaborated on connections with
communication and information theory [13], [14] and fo-
cused on computational and structural issues [15]–[20].
These important structural information aspects arising
from cooperating agents have received much less attention
in the dynamic game literature, which tends to focus only
on non-cooperative and adversarial behavior. The most well
studied case is the two-player problem, which features two
opposing agents who have centralized information structures
and has connections to robust control [21]. What is currently
under explored is a comprehensive study of information
structure aspects when there are both non-cooperative ele-
ments, as in general dynamic game theory, and cooperative
elements, as in decentralized control theory. These aspects
can be captured by a two-team stochastic dynamic game
framework.
Two-team stochastic dynamic games feature two opposing
teams with decentralized information structures for both the
attacking and defending teams: each agent must act based
on partial information measured or received locally in a way
that coordinates its actions with team members and counters
against the opposing team. This framework mathematically
formalizes “red team-blue team” scenarios that qualitatively
assess network security and resilience. In comparison to
decentralized control theory, a team adversarial element is
added. In comparison to general dynamic game theory, a
sharp contrast between cooperation with teammates and con-
flict against adversaries is preserved. Further, the stochastic
element (modeled by a “chance” or “Nature” player in the
game) allows the inclusion of random component failures
and disturbance signals.
There is currently a lack of deep theoretical and compu-
tational understanding in this class of dynamic games. A
static version of the problem was studied in [22]. Many
fundamental questions that been answered in static or single
team decentralized control settings do not have counterparts
in the two-team setting.
The main contributions of the present paper are as follows.
We formulate a two-team stochastic dynamic game problem
and introduce a concept of mutual quadratic invariance,
which defines a class of interacting information structures
for the two teams under which optimal linear feedback
control strategies are easy to compute. This is analogous
to the concept of quadratic invariance in (single team)
decentralized control [15]. We show that for zero-sum two-
team dynamic games, structured state feedback saddle point
equilibrium strategies can be computed from equivalent
structured disturbance feedforward saddle point equilibrium
strategies. However, for nonzero-sum games we show via a
counterexample that a similar equivalence fails to hold for
structured Nash equilibrium strategies. Finally, we present a
numerical example, which illustrates the importance of the
information structure on the value of the game.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section
II provides preliminaries on static team games. Section III
formulates a two-team stochastic dynamic game. Sections
IV and V develop results on disturbance feedforward and
state feedback strategies and introduce the concept of mutual
quadratic invariance. Section VI presents illustrative numer-
ical experiments, and Section VII gives some concluding
remarks and future research directions.
II. TWO-TEAM STOCHASTIC STATIC GAMES
In this section we review basic results for a two-team
stochastic static game. In this setting, two teams who both
know the distribution parameters of a Gaussian random
vector w need to decide strategies to compute vectors u ∈
R
m and v ∈ Rq as a function of the realization w ∈ Rn
in order to minimize the expectation of different quadratic
forms in w, u, v. Each team is composed of multiple agents,
each of which observes a different linear function of w and
decides a portion of the vectors u or v.
More formally, given a vector w ∼ N (mw,Σw), where
Σw ≻ 0, consider the following game
T1 :


min
κi(·)
Ew (J1(w, u, v))
s. t. ui = κi(Ciw)
∀i ∈ Z[1,N ]
, T2 :


min
λj(·)
Ew (J2(w, u, v))
s. t. vj = λj(Γiw)
∀j ∈ Z[1,M ]
(1)
where Ji(w, u, v) :=
 wu
v


⊤ 
 Hi ww Hi wu Hi wvH⊤i wu Hi uu Hi uv
H⊤i wv H
⊤
i uv Hi vv



 wu
v

 ,
i ∈ {1, 2}
are the objective functions of each team, and κi(·), i ∈
Z[1,N ] and λj(·), j ∈ Z[1,M ] are Borel measurable functions
corresponding to the decision strategies of agents on team 1
and 2, respectively.
Assumption 1: We assume[
H1 uu H1 uv
H⊤1 uv H2 vv
]
≻ 0,
[
H1 uu H2 uv
H⊤2 uv H2 vv
]
≻ 0.
Note that in the zero-sum case (J1 = −J2) , Assumption 1
is standard to guarantee the existence of a saddle point
equilibrium to the game without decentralized information
structure [23, condition 6.3.9]. If J1 = J2, Assumption 1
reduces to the standard positive definite assumption of team
theory [6].
We now define the set of Nash optimal strategies for the
game in (1).
Definition 1: A pair of strategies (κ⋆(·), λ⋆(·))
of the form [κ⋆⊤1 (C1 ·), . . . , κ⋆⊤N (Cn ·)]⊤ and
[λ⋆⊤1 (Γ1 ·), . . . , λ
⋆⊤
M (Γn ·)]
⊤ is Nash optimal for the
game in (1) if

κ⋆(·) ∈ argmin
κ(·)
EwJ1(w, λ
⋆(w), κ(w))
λ⋆(·) ∈ argmin
λ(·)
EwJ2(w, λ(w), κ
⋆(w)).
(2)
Under Assumption 1, the game in (1) admits a unique set
of linear Nash optimal strategies, which can be computed
by solving a set of linear equations derived from stationarity
conditions [22]. This turns out to be a special case of a
general multi-player, multi-objective linear quadratic static
game considered in [24].
III. TWO-TEAM STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES
Problem (1) is a static game. There is no concept of time
and causality of the information pattern. In this section we
formulate a dynamic game, where two teams can influence
the state evolution of a dynamical system. The agents on each
team decide a portion of an input signal based on different
observations of the system state over time. Decision must be
causal: each player is only allowed to use past or, at most,
present information.
Our focus will be on the role of information structures
for both teams in determining equilibrium strategies. Dy-
namic games offer a rich variety of information structures.
Specific instances have been considered in the literature,
with much work on various types of centralized structures
[1] and some work on structures defined by spatiotemporal
decentralization patterns. For example, a one-step-delay ob-
servation sharing pattern was shown in [24] to admit unique
linear optimal strategies. There has been recent progress in
(single team) decentralized control on information structure
issues, including a characterization of information structures
called quadratically invariant that yield convex control design
problems [15]. Here we seek an analogous result in a two-
team game setting.
Consider the system
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +B1u(t) +B2v(t) + w(t), (3)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the system state at time t with x(0) ∼
N (0,Σ0), u(t) ∈ Rm1 is the input for team 1 at time t,
v(t) ∈ Rm2 is the input for team 2 at time t, and w(t) ∼
N (0,Σt) is a random disturbance. The cost functions for
each team are given by
Ji := E
(
N−1∑
t=0
x(t)⊤Mi(t)x(t) + u(t)
⊤Ri(t)u(t)
+ v(t)⊤Vi(t)v(t)
)
+ x(N)⊤Mi(N)x(N), i ∈ {1, 2},
(4)
where Mi(0) = 0n×n, Mi(t) = Mi(t)⊤ ∈ Rn×n, Ri(t)
= Ri(t)
⊤ ∈ Rm1×m1 and Vi(t) = Vi(t)⊤ ∈ Rm2×m2 .
By defining the matrices A = blockdiag(A, . . . , A) ∈
R
n(N+1)×n(N+1)
,
Bi =


Bi 0 0
0
.
.
. 0
.
.
. Bi
0 · · · 0

 ∈ Rn(N+1)×mjN , i ∈ {1, 2},
Mi = blockdiag(0,Mi(1), . . . ,Mi(N)) ∈
R
n(N+1)×n(N+1)
, Ri = blockdiag(Ri(0), . . . , Ri(N − 1))
∈ Rm1N×m1N and Vi = blockdiag(Vi(0), . . . , Vi(N − 1))
∈ Rm2N×M2N for i ∈ {1, 2}, the vectors x =
(x(0), ..., x(N)) ∈ Rn(N+1), u = (u(0), ..., u(N − 1)) ∈
R
m1N
, v = (v(0), ..., v(N − 1)) ∈ Rm2N and
w = (x(0), w(0), ..., w(N − 1)) ∈ Rn(N+1), and the
shift matrix
Z :=


0
I
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
I 0

 ∈ Rn(N+1)×n(N+1),
we can write system (3) as
x = ZAx+ ZB1u+ ZB2v +w. (5)
The system in (5) can be rewritten compactly as
x =
[
P11 P12 P13
] wu
v

 , (6)
where P11 = (I − ZA)−1, P12 = (I − ZA)−1ZB1 and
P13 = (I − ZA)
−1ZB2. The cost functions in (4) can be
written in function of the vectorized inputs as
Ji(u,v) = Ew



 wu
v


⊤
Hi

 wu
v



 , i ∈ {1, 2},
where
Hi =
 P⊤11MiP11 P⊤11MiP12 P⊤11MiP13P⊤12MiP11 P⊤12MiP12 +Ri P⊤12MiP13
P⊤13MiP11 P
⊤
13MiP12 P
⊤
13MiP13 + Vi

 ,
for i = {1, 2}.
We are interested in the finite horizon, two-team stochastic
dynamic game where:
• Team 1 minimizes J1(u,v)
• Team 2 minimizes J2(u,v)
• Each team choses a structured causal state feedback
strategy of the form
u = K1(x), v = K2(x). K1 ∈ S1, K2 ∈ S2,
where Ki : Rn(N+1) → RmiN , for i ∈ {1, 2} are mea-
surable functions and S1 and S2 define an information
structure for each team.
We define a information structure Si ∈ {0, 1}n(N+1)×miN
as a binary matrix. Ki ∈ Si indicates that, if [Si]jk = 0,
then the j th element of Ki is not a function of xk. By
choosing the information structures one can enforce causality
and a prescribed spatiotemporal structure on the controller
strategies.
IV. MUTUAL QUADRATIC INVARIANCE
In decentralized control with quadratically invariant infor-
mation structures, the controller structure can be enforced on
an affine parameter that defines the achievable set of closed-
loop systems and recover a structured feedback controller.
We now follow a similar approach in the two-team setting.
A. Disturbance feedforward strategies
By searching for measurable disturbance feedforward
strategies of the type u = Q1(P11w) and v = Q2(P11w),
where Q1 ∈ S1 and Q2 ∈ S2, we recover the formulation
of (1). Provided that Assumption 1 is satisfied, there exists
a unique Nash equilibrium of the form u = Q¯1P11w, v =
Q¯2P11w in the space of linear strategies [22]. The matrices
Q¯1, Q¯2 can be easily computed by solving a linear system
of equations or a sequence of semidefinite programs [22],
[24]. Assumption 1 for the dynamic game problem becomes[
P⊤12M1P12 +R1 P
⊤
12M1P13
P⊤13M1P12 P
⊤
13M2P13 + S2
]
≻ 0,[
P⊤12M2P12 +R2 P
⊤
12M2P13
P⊤13M2P12 P
⊤
13M1P13 + S1
]
≻ 0.
We can define new cost functions that depend on the ma-
trices Q1 and Q2 describing linear disturbance feedforward
strategies as
Ji
([
Q1
Q2
])
= Ji(u,v)
∣∣∣∣
u=Q1P11w,v=Q2P11w
. (7)
In particular,
Ji
([
Q1
Q2
])
= ‖M
1
2
i (I + P12Q1 + P13Q2)P11Σ
1
2
w‖
2
F
+ ‖R
1
2
i Q1Σ
1
2
w‖
2
F + ‖V
1
2
i Q2Σ
1
2
w‖
2
F ,
where Σ
1
2
w is the covariance of w.
B. Equivalent state feedback strategies
It is easy to show that there exists a bijective relationship
between a pair of linear disturbance feedforward strategies
(Q1,Q2) and an equivalent pair of linear state feedback
strategies described by the matrices (K1,K2). More precisely,
using (6) we obtain[
u
v
]
=
[
Q1
Q2
]
P11w
=
[
Q1
Q2
]
x−
[
Q1
Q2
] [
P12 P13
] [ u
v
]
.
(8)
We can define the function g such that([
K1
K2
])
= g
([
Q1
Q2
])
,
where
g
([
Q1
Q2
])
=
(
I +
[
Q1
Q2
] [
P12 P13
])−1 [ Q1
Q2
]
.
Using a similar approach to (8), one can construct the
inverse mapping that, given a pair of feedback strategies,
recovers the equivalent feedforward strategies.
[
Q1
Q2
]
= g−1
([
K1
K2
])
,
where the map g−1 takes the form
g−1
([
K1
K2
])
=[
K1
K2
](
I −
[
P12 P13
] [ K1
K2
])−1
.
Given a pair of linear feedback strategies K1 and K2,
the cost for player i can be evaluated by considering the
equivalent feedforward strategies as
Ji(u,v)
∣∣∣∣
u=K1x,v=K2x
= Ji
(
g−1
([
K1
K2
]))
,
where Ji is defined in (7).
Now that we have a way to construct feedback strategies
which are equivalent to any set of linear feedforward strate-
gies, we need to establish a condition that guarantees that
such equivalent feedback strategies will preserve the desired
structure.
C. Mutual Quadratic Invariance
We know form the quadratic invariance literature [15], [25]
that Q1 ∈ S1 and Q2 ∈ S2 ⇐⇒ K1 ∈ S1 and K2 ∈ S2 if
and only if for all (K1,K2) ∈ S1 × S2 it holds that[
K1
K2
] [
P12 P13
] [ K1
K2
]
∈ S1 × S2, (9)
in other words S1 × S2 is quadratically invariant under
[ P12 P13 ]. We define this property as mutual quadratic
invariance. We can expand (9) as[
K1
K2
]
∈ S1 × S2 =⇒
{
K1P12K1, K1P13K2 ∈ S1
K2P12K1, K2P13K2 ∈ S2.
(10)
By observing (9) we note that MQI is equivalent to QI
for a control problem where both decisions u and v are
taken by a single decision maker. MQI information structures
will allow us to compute equilibrium strategies in two-team
games.
V. COMPUTING EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES
We have seen in Section IV that given structures S1
and S2 which are mutually quadratically invariant under
P12 and P13, one can easily obtain a Nash equilibrium in
the disturbance feedforward strategies. Furthermore once we
recover the equivalent state feedback strategies the structure
is preserved. There is still a nontrivial question that needs to
be answered.
Problem 1: Given a Nash equilibrium in the feedforward
strategies (Q¯1, Q¯2), are the equivalent feedback strategies([
K¯1
K¯2
])
= g
([
Q¯1
Q¯2
])
, (11)
a Nash equilibrium in the feedback strategies?
In order to understand why the answer to Problem 1 is
nontrivial, we first present a counterexample for a nonzero
sum game.
A. Nonzero sum game
Consider the following problem instance with
N = 2, A = 2, B1 = 0.4, B2 = 0.1,
Σ0 = 1, Σt = 1 ∀t,
M1(t) = R1(t) = S1(t) = 1 ∀t,
M2(t) = 70 ∀t, R2(t) = S2(t) = 1 ∀t.
(12)
This is a single state, two-stage, two-player problem, and we
will consider centralized, causal strategies, which are readily
verified to be mutually quadratically invariant. Using distur-
bance feedforward strategies, the problem can be reduced to
a static game whose unique Nash Equilibrium strategies are
readily computed using methods from [22], [24]. This yields
the Nash pair (Q¯1, Q¯2), where
Q¯1 =
[
−0.6795 0 0
0.6283 −0.4301 0
]
,
Q¯2 =
[
−11.890 0 0
10.996 −7.5269 0
]
.
(13)
The corresponding equilibrium value for player 1 is
J ∗1
([
Q¯1
Q¯2
])
= 220. The corresponding state feedback
strategies are
K¯1 =
[
−0.6795 0 0
0 −0.4301 0
]
,
K¯2 =
[
−11.890 0 0
0 −7.5269 0
]
,
(14)
However, (K¯1, K¯2) is not a Nash Equilibrium in state
feedback strategies since it is readily verified that
J1
(
g−1
([
Kˆ1
K¯2
]))
= 206.1, where
Kˆ1 =
[
−1.853 0 0
0 −0.4301 0
]
. (15)
Although the sparsity structure is preserved between the
disturbance feedforward and state feedback strategies since
the information structure is mutually quadratically invariant,
the Nash Equilibrium property is not preserved. Thus, for
this particular non-zero sum dynamic game, the answer to
the question posed in Problem 1 is negative. We show next
that this situation does not occur in zero-sum games.
B. Zero sum game
Let us now consider the zero sum game case, where the
objective function of one team is precisely the negative of
that of the other team. Such problems can be re-written as a
min-max problem of the form.
min
u
max
w
J(u,v) := Ew



 wu
v


⊤
H

 wu
v



 (16)
As before we are interested in strategies of the form
u = K1(x), v = K2(x). K1 ∈ S1, K2 ∈ S2,
where S1 and S2 are prescribed sets of structured causal
controllers. As zero-sum games are a special case of nonzero
sum games, provided Assumption 1 holds, we can find
structured Nash equilibria (rather saddle point equilibrium
in the zero sum context) if we consider linear strategies of
the form u = Q1P11w and v = Q2P11w. For the zero sum
game of the form (16), Assumption 1 reads[
P⊤12MP12 +R P
⊤
12MP13
P⊤13MP12 −
(
P⊤13MP13 + S
) ] ≻ 0.
As before, given the saddle point equilibrium in the feed-
forward strategies, when S1 and S2 are mutually quadrati-
cally invariant, we can compute equivalent linear feedback
strategies that preserve the structure. In the zero-sum case,
however, we can relate the equilibrium property of the
feedforward strategies to that of the state feedback strategies.
We start with a result that shows that the maps g and
g−1 preserve stationary points. We begin by noting that for
a zero-sum game J1 = −J2.
Lemma 1: Given[
Q¯1
Q¯2
]
= g−1
([
K¯1
K¯2
])
then
∂J1
([
Q1
Q2
])
∂Q1
∣∣∣∣
Q1=Q¯1,Q2=Q¯2
∈ S⊥1 ,
∂J2
([
Q1
Q2
])
∂Q2
∣∣∣∣
Q1=Q¯1,Q2=Q¯2
∈ S⊥2 ,
(17)
if and only if
∂J1
(
g−1
([
K1
K2
]))
∂K1
∣∣∣∣
K1=K¯1,K2=K¯2
∈ S⊥1 ,
∂J2
(
g−1
([
K1
K2
]))
∂K2
∣∣∣∣
K1=K¯1,K2=K¯2
∈ S⊥2 ,
(18)
Proof: Let us simplify the notation and define
Q :=
[
Q1
Q2
]
, K :=
[
K1
K2
]
, P :=
[
P12 P13
]
.
We start by proving the only if part. Note that since J1 =
−J2,
∂J2
([
Q1
Q2
])
∂Q2
∣∣∣∣
Q1=Q¯1,Q2=Q¯2
∈ S⊥2
if and only if
∂J1
([
Q1
Q2
])
∂Q2
∣∣∣∣
Q1=Q¯1,Q2=Q¯2
∈ S⊥2 .
Assume (18) holds, and suppose (17) does not hold. Then
there exist Q˜ ∈ S1 × S2, with Q˜ 6= 0 such that
lim
ε→0
J1(Q¯+ εQ˜)− J (Q¯)
ε
= κ 6= 0,
or equivalently
lim
ε→0
J1
(
g−1
(
g
(
Q¯+ εQ˜
)))
− J
(
Q¯
)
ε
= κ 6= 0. (19)
We know that
g
(
Q¯+ εQ˜
)
=
(
I +
(
Q¯+ εQ˜
)
P
)−1 (
Q¯+ εQ˜
)
=
(
I + Q¯P + εQ˜P
)−1 (
Q¯+ εQ˜
)
=
[
(I + Q¯P)−1 + ε(I + Q¯P)−1Q˜P(I + Q¯P)−1
+O(ε2)
] (
Q¯+ εQ˜
)
= K¯ + εK˜ +O(ε2),
(20)
where
K˜ = (I + Q¯P)−1Q˜+ (I + Q¯P)−1Q˜P(I + Q¯P)−1Q¯.
Using [15, Theorem 14 + Theorem 26], and mutual
quadratic invariance it is easy to conclude that, K˜ ∈ S1×S2.
Substituting (20) in (19) and using the fact that Q¯ = g (K¯)
one obtains
lim
ε→0
J1
(
g−1
(
K¯ + εK˜ +O(ε2)
))
− J
(
g−1
(
K¯
))
ε
=
lim
ε→0
J1
(
g−1
(
K¯ + εK˜
))
− J
(
g−1
(
K¯
))
ε
= κ 6= 0,
which, since K˜ ∈ S1 ×S2, is in contradiction with (18) and
thus proves the claim.
The converse direction can be proven analogously.
Note that Lemma 1 only holds for zero-sum games as the
proof heavily relies to the fact that J1 = −J2. We are now
ready to state our main result, which allows us to construct
a saddle point Equilibrium in the space of linear feedback
strategies.
Theorem 2: Let (Q¯1, Q¯2) be the unique saddle point equi-
librium in the disturbance feedforward strategies. Then if
there exists a saddle point equilibrium in state feedback
strategies, it is unique and given by[
K¯1
K¯2
]
= g
([
Q¯1
Q¯2
])
.
Proof:
Let (Kˆ1, Kˆ2) be any saddle point equilibrium in state
feedback linear strategies. Let (Qˆ1, Qˆ2) be the corresponding
disturbance feedforward policy. Since (Kˆ1, Kˆ2) is stationary,
so is (Qˆ1, Qˆ2) by Lemma 1. Since J is convex quadratic in
Q1 and concave quadratic in Q2, it follows from Assumption
1 that the stationary point is unique. Thus, (Qˆ1, Qˆ2) =
(Q¯1, Q¯2). Since g is bijective, (Kˆ1, Kˆ2) = (K¯1, K¯2). Thus,
(K¯1, K¯2) is the unique saddle point equilibrium in state
feedback linear strategies due to the uniqueness of (Q¯1, Q¯2).
This result allows computation of structured equilibrium
feedback strategies in two-team stochastic dynamic games
with mutually quadratically invariant information structures.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We now present a very simple illustrative numerical ex-
ample. The mutual quadratic invariance property allows us to
compute equilibrium strategies and values under these infor-
mation structures and thereby to understand the importance
of different information structures in dynamical games. We
consider a two player system depicted in Figure 1, which
can be interpreted as a simple transportation network.
x1 x2
u v
w1 w2
Fig. 1: Two player network
Each subsystem consists of a buffer with single integrator
dynamics. System 1 stores x1 and can control input u that
transfers some of the good stored in its buffer to System
2. System 2 stores x2 and can control input v to discard
some of the good. Both systems are affected by random
disturbances which are normally distributed with zero mean
and unit variance. The dynamics of the system is
[
x+1
x+2
]
=
[
1 0
0 1
] [
x1
x2
]
+[
−1
1
]
u+
[
0
−1
]
v +
[
w1
w2
]
(21)
Given the dynamics in (21) with w1(t), w2(t), x(0) ∼
N (0, 1) we consider the following zero sum dynamic game
min
u
max
v
10∑
t=1
2Ex21(t) + Eu
2(t− 1)+
−Ex22(t)− 2Ev
2(t− 1)
s. t. u = K1x, K1 ∈ S1
v = K2x, K2 ∈ S2,
(22)
where x = (x(0), ..., x(10)), u = (u(0), ..., u(9)), v =
(v(0), ..., v(9)). Both players benefit from keeping the vari-
ance of their state and input low and from increasing the
variance of the opponent’s state and input. We will compare
the results for different information structures S1 and S2, all
of which are mutually quadratically invariant. In particular,
we consider:
• Causal controllers with full information (FI). That is
both players have access to all past and present infor-
mation.
S1 = S2 =


⋆ ⋆
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆
.
.
.


.
• One step delay information sharing (1SDIS). At time t
both players do not know the opponent’s current state
but have full information up to time t− 1.
S1 =


⋆ 0
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ 0
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ 0
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ 0
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ 0
.
.
.


,
S2 =


0 ⋆
⋆ ⋆ 0 ⋆
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ 0 ⋆
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ 0 ⋆
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ 0 ⋆
.
.
.


.
TABLE I: The cost at the Nash Equilibrium for the three
different information structures. A smaller cost is indicates
an advantage for Player 1 who is minimizing in (22), while
a larger cost is an advantage for Player 2.
Equilibrium cost for the different information structures
Structure Equilibrium Cost (22)
FI -1.58
1SDIS -10.02
DP1 0.00
• Decentralized control for Player 1 (DP1). Player 1 only
has access to present and past information about its own
state, Player 2 has full information.
S1 =


⋆ 0
⋆ 0 ⋆ 0
⋆ 0 ⋆ 0 ⋆ 0
⋆ 0 ⋆ 0 ⋆ 0 ⋆ 0
⋆ 0 ⋆ 0 ⋆ 0 ⋆ 0 ⋆ 0
.
.
.


,
and S2 has full information.
It is easily verifiable that all such structures respect the
mutual quadratic invariance assumption for the given system.
We computed the Nash equilibrium feedforward strategies
(Q¯1, Q¯2) for the three different information structures using
the method proposed in [22]. We applied Theorem 2 to
compute the linear saddle point equilibrium in the state
feedback strategies as[
K¯1
K¯2
]
= g
([
Q¯1
Q¯2
])
.
In Table I we observe the different costs at equilibrium. Note
the large difference in cost function that is achieved for
different information structures. Using the full information
structure as a baseline, as we expect, Player 1 is penalized
by using decentralized information (DP1). On the other hand,
Player 1 obtains a great advantage with the one step delay
information sharing (1SDIS) structure.
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of the cost function of (22)
for the different information structures and allows us to
understand why certain information structures are more
beneficial for different players. For example, if we consider
1SDIS we notice that Player 1 can exploit the fact that its
opponent has no information on Player 1’s current state and
input and it uses this to dramatically increase the variance
of x2. To do so Player 1 needs to ‘spend’ some variance in
u, which is also increased. The net gain, however, is clearly
in favor of Player 1.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have considered a two-team linear quadratic stochastic
dynamic game with decentralized information structures for
both teams. We introduced the concept of Mutual Quadratic
Invariance (MQI), which defines a class of interacting team
FI 1SDIS DP1
5
10
15
20
25
30
2
∑
Ex1(t)
2
∑
Eu(t)2
∑
Ex2(t)
2 2
∑
Ev(t)2
Fig. 2: Breakdown of the cost function of (22) for the three
information structures
information structures for which equilibrium strategies can
be easily computed. We demonstrated an equivalence of
disturbance feedforward and state feedback saddle point
equilibrium strategies that facilitates this computation in
zero-sum games, and we showed such an equivalence fails to
hold for Nash equilibrium strategies in nonzero-sum games.
A numerical example showed how mutually quadratically
invariant information structures can be evaluated and how
different structures can lead to significantly different equi-
librium values.
Many fundamental questions remain open in two-team
stochastic dynamic games. For example, issues involving
infinite horizon and boundedness of the equilibrium value
(stability), separation and certainty equivalence, games with
incomplete model information, and design of information
structures can be considered. Some of these results may
take inspiration from recent progress on information structure
issues in decentralized control.
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